Educational Reform in Developing Countries: Private Involvement and Partnerships by Argentino Pessoa
Educational Reform in  Educational Reform in 
Developing Countries: Private  Developing Countries: Private 
Involvement and Partnerships Involvement and Partnerships
Argentino Pessoa
FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS
Research 
Work in 
Progress FEP  WORKING  PAPERS FEP  WORKING  PAPERS
n. 284, July 2008  1
EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  




Faculdade de Economia do Porto 
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias 








The  paper  looks  at  recent  changes  in  the  role  of  government  in  the  provision  of 
education  in  Developing  Countries.  It begins with  a reflection  about the  concept  of 
public-private partnership (PPP), discusses the rationale that inspires the ‘contracting 
out’ of educational services and describes several cases of private sector involvement in 
education.  After  looking  at  the  conditions  for  building  PPPs  and  the  necessary 
requirements  for  assuring  an  effective  regulatory  framework,  the  paper  closes 
concluding that while contracting out needs not be made a priority there is a large room 




Keywords:  Contracting  out,  educational  reform,  market/government  failure,  NPM, 
public-private partnerships. 
 
JEL codes: H52, I28, L33. 
 
                                                 
*  This paper  will  be published  in  the ICFAI Journal of Higher Education, ICFAI University Press, 
Hyderabad, India.   2
 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  





The  specificity  of  education  in  developing  countries  is  well  known.  A  different 
demographic structure makes that demand for education in developing countries is more 
pressing  than  in  developed  ones.  But  besides  this,  while  in  high-income  countries 
‘differentiated’  demand  leads  to  a  demand  for  private  schooling,  as  a  sophisticated 
clientele demands different kinds of schools (Patrinos, 2000), in low-income countries 
excess demand for schooling does not always result in private supply and, when this 
happens,  it is  because the  state  cannot afford  schooling  for  all and,  simultaneously, 
people recognize the benefits of schooling (James, 1987, 1991). 
Traditionally,  public  intervention  in  education  has  been  justified  on  basically  two 
reasons: It can increase efficiency – obtaining the greatest possible output from a given 
amount of expenditure; it can reduce inequality, opening opportunities for the poor and 
disadvantaged, compensating for market failures in lending for education, and turning 
information about the benefits of education more generally available. However, it has 
been  argued  that  public  spending  on  education  is  often  inefficient  because  it  is 
misallocated and inequitable since qualified potential students are unable to enroll in 
institutions for the reason that either educational opportunities are lacking or they lack 
the ability to pay for them (James, 1991). Furthermore, the goals of quality, efficiency, 
access and quantity usually conflict in that an increase in quantity or enrolment may be 
at variance with the goal of enhancing quality. Indeed, this conflict has been much more 
salient in developing countries owing to the scarcity of qualified teachers
1.  
So,  policy  makers  have  increasingly  recognized  that  the  traditional  methods  of 
education financing and management, and provision were unable to deliver quality basic 
                                                 
1 Two examples are illustrative of the scarcity of qualified teachers in developing countries: in Colombia 
38 percent of teachers have no sufficient qualifications (Villa and Duarte, 2004); in PIEDAR schools, in 
rural Punjab, there are teachers that only have the primary level as qualification (Asia Foundation, 2000).   3
education to all children and that radical changes were needed. Additionally, it was 
argued that public financing is growing more difficult as enrolments expand (World 
Bank, 1995) and the scarcity of public funds prevent many countries, and particularly 
the less developed ones, from attaining the necessary increase in educational levels. To 
solve this problem, many countries have adopted policies to charge tuition fees to get 
back part of the cost of providing public education services (Tomasevski, 2003); and/or 
encourage  development  of  private  schools  to  handle  at  least  part  of  the  expansion 
(Patrinos, 2000), with an increase in the emphasis of participation in education from the 
private sector. But, the recognition of the need to change the way education is provided 
and funded is also intrinsically linked to the emergence of the New Public Management 
(NPM) type reforms. 
In fact, in the end of the 1970s the disenchantment with government became apparent: 
the dominating view is that government has changed from the provider of public goods 
to a tax burden for the citizens. The government is regarded as ‘bureaucratic’ in the 
sense of too big, inefficient and unable to improve (e.g. Heclo, 1981). Partly owing to 
this disillusionment and partly due to fiscal pressures, there has been a wave of public 
sector reforms throughout the world since the 1980s. Many reforms in this wave share 
some characteristics that later have been known as NPM (see, e.g. Hood, 1991; Boston, 
1996; Minouge et al., 1998). NPM is both a set of tools used to change the public sector 
and a new management philosophy, which seeks to enhance the efficiency of the public 
sector and the control that government has over it. The key hypothesis in the NPM-
reform is that more market orientation in the public sector will lead to greater cost-
efficiency for governments, without having negative side effects on other objectives. 
So, NPM looks to achieve efficiency gains by applying competition, as it is known in 
the  private  sector,  to  organizations  of  public  sector,  emphasizing  economic  and 
leadership principles.  
A great deal of tools advocated by the NPM, and present in this wave of reforms, are 
forms of private involvement in the provision of public services, being one of them the 
public-private  partnership  (PPP).  But,  although  ‘Partnership’  has  become  a  standard 
buzzword in the NGO and ‘development’ world (Ahmad, 2006) and the idea of a PPP in 
general  is  theoretically  appealing,  there  has  been  much  confusion  in  using  the 
expression  PPP.  Often  donor  agencies  and  governments  promoted  privatization  and   4
provided subsidies to private entrepreneurs in the name of building PPPs (World Bank 
1986), while they are promoting other forms of private involvement, perhaps because 
‘the  theoretical  understanding  of  partnership,  from  an  organizational  perspective,  is 
limited’ (Lister, 2000, p. 236). On the other hand, there have been an excessive use of 
the term PPP in education, qualifying as a PPP any involvement of the private sector in 
education  even  in  cases  in  which  both  services  and  funding  are  not  provided  by 
government,  sufficing  for  that  label  that  government  set  the  rules  where  private 
providers  play  (see,  for  instance,  Navarro  et  al.,  2004),  or  even  ‘the  simple  act  of 
sending  child  to  a  school’  (Asia  Foundation,  2000,  p.  320).  In  this  paper  we  use 
examples  from  the  educational  sector  reforms  and  from  private  involvement  in 
education in developing countries to show the diversity of forms abridged under the 
umbrella concept of PPP and to illustrate the potential of some of those forms in the 
provision of education. Additionally, the present paper aims to contribute to a more 
precise  concept  of  PPP,  one  that  underlines  the  strategic  aspects  of  a  sustained 
collaboration between actors of the two sectors. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we’ll begin with some reflections 
about NPM and the concept of PPP. In section 3 we’ll describe some reasons which 
must  configure  the  role  of  government  in  providing  education  services.  Section  4 
discusses the ‘making’ versus ‘contracting out’ decisions and the pros and cons of the 
two  options.  Section  5  describes  several  cases  of  private  sector  involvement  in 
education  in  developing  countries,  often  referred  to  as  PPPs.  Section  6  deals  with 
conditions for building PPPs and with necessary requirements in order to assure an 
effective regulatory framework in developing countries. The paper closes with some 
conclusions for discussion and future research. 
 
2. The NPM debate and PPPs 
The NPM debate opened in developed countries, like the USA (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992),  the  UK  and  New  Zealand  (Boston,  1996;  OECD,  1995),  spills  over  to  the 
developing  ones  (McCourt,  2002)  with  a  considerable  impact  on  social  services 
delivery, the provision of education being no exception. Additionally, in the context of a 
worldwide welfare systems reform, decentralization of services from the national to the   5
local level is frequently suggested in conjunction with an improved participation of the 
population in determining and implementing the services (Mehrotra, 2006). However 
the management decentralization proposed by NPM is not equivalent to the political 
decentralization advanced by other more participatory theories (Polidano, 1999). 
In the terminology of the supporters of NPM reforms there is often an imprecision on 
the use of the term PPP, mainly in the public services like education or health care 
sectors
2.  For  instance,  Savas  (1990,  2000,  2005)  defined  PPP  as  an  arrangement  in 
which a government and a private entity, for-profit or not for profit, jointly perform or 
undertake a traditionally public activity. Examples of arrangements that can be included 
in this broader concept ranging from education vouchers used in private schools and 
other forms of public funding of private schools to the management of public schools by 
private firms (Navarro et al., 2004). Many of these forms of private involvement can be 
more accurately categorized as forms of privatization, in the sense of outsourcing public 
services by private firms, as is the case of several forms where the role of the private 
actor is the provision of the education service and the public role is limited to paying the 
service provided. Savas (2005) is aware of the ambiguity of the expression but he also 
recognizes  its  usefulness:  ‘public-private  partnership’  is  sometimes  a  useful  phrase 
because  it  avoids  the  inflammatory  effect  of  ‘privatization’  on  those  ideologically 
opposed. In the present paper, rather than following this view we aim to contribute to a 
more precise concept of PPP.  
We define PPP as a sustained collaborative effort between the public sector and the 
private  sector
3  to  achieve  a  common  objective  while  both  players  pursue  their  own 
individual interests (Pessoa, 2007). This definition implies that in a PPP each partner 
shares in the design; contributes a fraction of the financial, managerial and technical 
resources  needed  to  execute,  and  sometimes  operate,  the  plan  conducting  to  that 
                                                 
2  A  narrow  concept  of  PPP  is  usually  used  for  infrastructures,  where  PPP  is  defined  as  a  complex 
relationship often involving at least one government unit and a consortium of private firms created to 
build large, capital-intensive, long-lived public infrastructure, such as a highway, airport, public building, 
or water system, or to undertake a major civic redevelopment project (Savas, 2005). 
3 The composition of the private sector is varied. The private sector can be classified into private-for-
profit  organizations  (e.g.,  commercial  enterprises)  and  private  not-for-profit  associations  (e.g., 
humanitarian  NGOs,  professional  associations,  and  other  non-government  institutions).  Whereas  the 
focus of PPP at first has been on the relationship between the government and the for-profit sector, in this 
paper we use the expression ‘private sector’ in a broad sense, encompassing both for-profit and not-for-
profit activities.    6
objective in accordance with each partner's comparative advantage, and partially takes 
on  the  risks  associated  with  the  project  and  obtains  the  benefits,  expected  by  each 
partner, which the project creates. The critical element reflected in this definition is the 
sharing of decision-making authority, which contrasts with the ‘supplier’ relationship in 
which government decides exactly what it wants and buys it to a private supplier, and 
the ‘public enterprise’ model in which the government produces the services with no 
private sector involvement. 
Defined in the above-mentioned way, a PPP entails some assumptions. Firstly, a change 
in roles: a PPP requires a shift in the roles and attitudes of public and private entities, 
moving away from the usual client-contractor approach towards focusing on the core 
functions of supervision and regulation by the public authorities, and assuming greater 
responsibilities and risks in execution, operation and the mobilization of resources by 
the  private  sector.  This  change  requires  a  transformation  of  the  partners  as  some 
capacities of the public sector are transferred away to the private sector. Secondly, a 
sustained collaborative effort in order to attain a common objective is assumed. The 
basis of the third ‘P’ of the PPP, entails a joint alliance between the public and private 
sectors beyond the traditional contractual relationship. Such association brings the best 
of each partner’s competence to optimize the achievement of the common objective. 
Given  the  mid-term,  or  long-term,  nature  of  that  objective  and  the  transformation 
generated by the shift in roles, the joint alliance needs to be sustained over a long period 
of time. The longer the nature of the objective, the larger are the uncertainties associated 
with the project and the more critical and relevant the third ‘P’ of a PPP becomes. 
Finally, an assumption on the individual interests of each partner is crucial: generally, it 
consists of a return of investment for the private partner
4, and a net benefit to the society 
and the economy as a whole for the public entity, through the achievement of specific 
goals,  such  as  the  improvement  of  the  actual  provision  and  deliverance  of  public 
services in an efficient way. Based on these assumptions, PPPs can be efficient forms of 
enhancing well-being and of promoting growth 
                                                 
4 If the private partner belongs to the not-for-profit category, the private interest is generally a way of 
attaining its own main object more easily. For a review of the current literature on partnerships between 
Northern and Southern NGOs and for an assessment of the role of NGOs, see Ahmad (2006).   7
The strategic management literature suggests that PPPs can contribute to competitive 
(or collaborative) advantage in three different ways (Bovaird, 2004): first, supplying 
economies of scale in the provision of specific services; second, providing economies of 
scope  or  the  ability  to  explore  more  fully  the  complementary  capabilities  and 
competences which exist in the partner organization(s); third, offering opportunities for 
mutual learning between partners which may be intended to lead to long-term dynamic 
process or interchange. While advantages of the first way can be found in outsourcing 
of education services depending on the capacity of the firm to whom the provision is 
approved, the two last are inherent to the collaborative effort of a PPP, as defined above. 
Advantages of both second and third ways are critical for enhancing the capability of a 
country to attain a development path.  
So, if a PPP is a new entity with an enlarged capability it brings efficiency and better 
service delivery through positive governance synergies. In developing countries PPPs 
could  potentially  produce  profound  transformation  of  methods  of  government 
intervention, based on solidarity between the public and private sectors (Sedjari, 2004). 
For  example,  strategic  partnerships  composed  by  for-profit  companies,  community 
groups  and  non-governmental  organizations  have  lent  a  hand  to  the  Moroccan 
government to make large progress in fighting against poverty and social exclusion. 
These partnerships have promoted adult literacy and informal education, and developing 
income  generating  activities  and  youth  employment  initiatives  sustained  over  an 
extended period of time with very successful outcomes (Sedjari, 2004). Viewed in this 
way,  PPPs  in  developing  countries  can  become  instruments  for  modernization  and 
renewal of the education delivery.  
 
3. The role of government in education 
In the provision of education, economic theory suggests that market failure and equity 
considerations call for governmental intervention. Overall the role of government can be 
described as consisting of the following: 
•  Overcoming market failures. To education, market failure means essentially either 
an under provision or a social and/or territorial unbalanced delivery. Where needs 
are likely to go unmet because of market failure, there is a role for the government   8
to step in. When the social benefits of services exceed the private benefits, sub-
optimal  provision  is  likely  and  this  often  calls  for  government  intervention.  An 
example of market failure in developing countries is the education of girls. Many 
families fail to see any benefit from sending girls to school or are averse to give up 
the  household  labor,  or  income,  they  make  available.  However,  as  a  social 
investment,  girls’  education  is  crucial  because  it  is  associated  with  improved 
opportunities for them to live longer, richer, and more rewarding lives — and with 
better  health  and  social  outcomes  for  their  children.  Thus,  by  encouraging  the 
education  of  girls,  through  educational  scholarships  or  consciousness-raising 
campaigns, governments can benefit both girls themselves as well as their families 
and communities. The list of positive externalities of education, that is, the positive 
effects of someone’s education on others, includes beneficial effects on families, co-
workers, communities, and society as a whole: improved health; consumer choices; 
productivity  and  labor  market  functioning;  a  social  and  political  structure  and 
environment with a common core of values; a better functioning democracy; lower 
crime; fewer individuals marginalized; etc.  
•  Providing for the poor, the rural and under-served populations. Providing education 
in rural areas tends to be particularly difficult, and generally unprofitable from a for 
profit private viewpoint. Not only rural populations are often small or dispersed but 
also private providers are often scarce or nonexistent. So, the public sector is best 
placed to provide a safety net for citizens who cannot otherwise afford education 
because offer is either nonexistent or, if existent they cannot pay its market prices. 
However,  this  can  be  achieved  by  providing  services  directly  or  by  creating 
incentives for the private sector to carry out the task
5.  
•  Implementing  appropriate  regulations  to  ensure  quality.  In  education,  quality  is 
usually monitored by evaluation and accreditation, with private institutions expected 
to meet minimum standards. Consumers will also act as a force for quality, but only 
if they have sufficient information. Governments can act as important providers of 
this  information.  To  address  this  failure  the  government  usually  reacts  doing 
                                                 
5 Government clearly has a role providing services here, but it can also act in other ways. For instance, it 
can either support religious and community schools or place obligations on private for profit providers to 
provide broader access when they occupy a monopoly position.   9
something to minimize the effects of asymmetric information, e.g. implementing the 
registration of schools and the official recognition of its quality. 
•  Controlling costs. Quite frequently, government acts to put a ceiling on fees private 
sector providers can charge. This is controversial, as it causes a market distortion, 
and should be done with care. However, restrictions may be necessary where there 
is little competition, no parallel public provision, or where consumers are relatively 
poorly informed about their needs and about the quality of the provision. 
•  Additionally, government must deal with other examples of market failures, such as 
the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard, associated to the privately run 
schools, which leads to an unequal coverage of education services
6. 
The presented stylized facts on the role of government have been mainly derived from 
theoretical considerations. However, some of the above mentioned points have to be 
equated with the possibility of government failures. If one looks at the government’s 
performance,  in  practice  one  has  to  recognize  that  due  to  allocative  inefficiency, 
operational  inefficiency  and  equity  problems  the  public  provision  sometimes  poses 
more problems than solutions. Additionally, one can argue that if education is costless 
provided and is easily reached, there is a cost-quality trade-off: people prefer to go to a 
private provider and to pay fees for obtaining an assured guarantee of quality
7. But if 
people prefer a private provider even if they have to pay fees, a question arises: Why 
not ‘contracting out’ education services? 
 
4. ‘Contracting out’ educational services 
The expression ‘contracting out’, in this context, means the outsourcing of activities 
formerly done by the public sector as popularized by the discussion of NPM. In the 
NPM debate context, outsourcing of public services is typically viewed as a means of 
maximizing  economic  efficiency—reducing  government  costs  while  increasing  the 
scope  and  quality  of  service  delivery  by  transferring  (or  ‘returning’)  government 
                                                 
6 For profit private schools will only include willingness to pay in their schemes. This behavior makes 
education spread among a society difficult and leaves the poor people to the public sector. 
7 Here we can trace some parallel with the health services: “If health care is provided for free and is 
accessible, then the quality is often so bad that people prefer to go to a private provider and to pay fees 
with a certain guarantee of a quality treatment” (Jütting, 1999, p. 10).   10
functions to the private sector (e.g., Butler, 1985; Donahue, 1989). In fact, the private 
sector is usually seen as more effective than the public sector at providing services 
because of two basic assumptions. On the one hand, for-profit firms need to be well 
managed for avoiding negative profits and consequent bankruptcy. One the other hand, 
private non-profit organizations are often supposed to be motivated by a strong sense of 
duty, which may lead them to offer higher quality services, especially social services for 
vulnerable people (Sanger 2001; Blank, 2000). As argued by Sedjari (2004), non-profit 
organizations  have  proved  especially  skilled  at  improving  provision  to  the  poorer 
people, because their size and flexibility allow them to achieve notable successes in 
areas where governments have failed.  
Although on efficiency grounds governmental agencies, as well as private companies, 
need to consider the costs and benefits of contracting out versus in-house provision, the 
final decision is often based on some assumptions, which imply that outsourcing, if 
done in the right fashion, enables governmental agencies to benefit from the combined 
force of specialization and competition, and therefore to reduce their costs substantially. 
Outside education, there has been a lot of experience with government contracting out 
social service provision to private firms, and there exists a literature that examines the 
serious  problems  with  doing  so  (Miller,  2001;  Wisniewski,  1991).  Looking  at  the 
private sector in general, and based on the above and on other references (Berman, 
1997; Blank, 2000; de Bettignies and Ross, 2004; Pessoa, 2008), we can summarize the 
strengths and weakness of contracting out public services (table 1).  
As is apparent from the analysis of table 1, several factors come into play in reaching 
efficient decisions. Factors like the need to fill a ‘capability gap’ or to reduce costs 
would advise the contracting out of some functions. If this is the case, public bodies 
face the need of, at least, maintaining quality constant. Such decisions should be based 
on the identification of the agency’s core functions and on the consideration of the costs 




                                                 
8 Kelman (2002) discusses other, more practical (candidate selection, criteria for evaluate bids, etc.), 
issues in detail.   11
 
Table 1. Pros and cons of contracting out 
Pros  Cons 
Reducing production 
costs, for the same level 
of quality 
 
Filling the ‘capabilities 
gap’ 
 
The replacement of 
direct, hierarchical 
management structure by 
contractual relationships 
between purchasers and 
providers will increase: 
•  transparency of 
prices 
•  competition 
 
Which will lead to a gain 
in efficiency. 
•  Private providers respond to the population’s willingness 
to pay for public services. As a result, they will serve 
those groups in the population who are most willing to 
pay, such as affluent urban residents. The result will be 
increased inequity in access and use of public services. 
•  Because  of  lower  willingness  to  pay,  private  providers 
will  undersupply  socially  desirable  services,  such  as 
primary education to the poorer part of population. This 
will  worsen  allocative  efficiency  in  the  corresponding 
sector. 
•  Driven  by  the  profit  motive,  and  because  they  have 
significant  control  over  demand,  private  providers  will 
take  advantage  of  clients  by  supplying  more  than  is 
required.  This  is  particularly  significant  in  health  care 
services,  but  may  also  occur  in  individual  education 
services  such  as  the  distribution  of  textbooks  or  the 
management of subsidiary services such as catering.  
•  Private providers can also take advantage of clients by 
providing  low-quality  services,  which  may  result  in 
welfare losses. 
The actual effect of these four major worries is as greater as 
there is lack of competition. 
Source: Pessoa (2008). 
 
The pros and cons of table 1 were stylized without considering the level of development 
of the countries where decisions are taken. However in a developing country context 
there are other additional problems arising from incomplete markets and information 
asymmetries, which have a significant impact on costs. In fact, considering the cost 
side,  contracting  out  is  justified  only  when  one  can  expect  to  decrease  the  sum  of 
production costs and the costs of managing the relationship between government and 
the supplier (Globerman and Vining, 1996). Outsourcing can lower the production costs 
but  these  savings  cannot  be  sufficient  to  compensate  the  increase  in  the  costs  of 
governance.  Where  the  complexity  of  the  task  is  high,  contestability  or  market 
competition  is  low,  asset  specificity,  and  consequently  investment  risk,  is  high, 
governance costs could prove to be tragically elevated for governments. As argued by   12
Van Slyke (2003) advocators of outsourcing seldom acknowledge that contracting out 
leads to additional public management costs such as developing program performance 
measures  and  evaluation  tools,  developing  and  maintaining  management  capacity  to 
supervise suppliers, etc.
. 
So,  contracting  out  will  increase  transaction  costs,  including  both  contracting  and 
monitoring costs (Sclar, 2000)
9. Given the governance structure or institutional context 
within  which  governments  transactions  are  negotiated  and  executed,  contracts  with 
private service or program providers are likely to be complex rather than simple, as was 
already  argued  by  Williamson  in  late  1970s.  In such environments,  the  transactions 
costs of designing, monitoring and enforcing complex contracts are very likely to be 
high (Williamson, 1979). These worries are more plausible in a developing country’s 
context, than in more advanced environments. Moreover, in the former the costs related 
to the loss of monopsony purchasing power and the social costs arising from equity 
problems (Robinson, 1990; von Otter and Saltman, 1992)
10 could be significant. But, 
these direct costs are not the only ones that must be controlled in contracting out private 
firms  to  run  schools.  In  this  specific  sector,  contracting-out  requires  maintaining 
minimum levels of qualified staff in-house in order to specify the contract terms clearly 
and in a way that fits the specific purposes of the activity, or to correct the service 
provided externally in the event of provider failure. 
There has been little experience in education with contracting out to private firms to run 
schools.  Of  course,  in  education  there  is considerable  contracting  out  to the  private 
sector for things like building schools or running a cafeteria, but these experiences with 
well-defined school inputs have little to do with the education service, which may be 
much  more  complicated  in  output  measurement.  And,  as  already  argued  by  Grizzle 
(1985),  output  measurement  is  critical  in  reaching  efficient  solutions.  McKean  and 
Browning (1975) discuss how and why overlooking any relevant objectives could lead 
to poor choices in outsourcing solutions. In the following we summarize the evidence 
                                                 
9 See also Coase (1960) for the economic framework in the ‘make vs. buy’ decisions, and Donahue 
(1989) for its practical applications. 
10  In  addition,  some  other  impacts  should  be  taken  into  account,  too.  As  Mills  (1995)  argues,  the 
introduction of contracts may both lead to a fragmentation or lack of co-ordination within the broader 
public service system, and could have an impact on staff resources with a drain of key personnel to the 
for-profit providers.   13
on the outsourcing of social services, and particularly on education, considering two 
objectives: cost savings and quality improvement. 
•  Cost Savings. A basic view of economic theory is that competitive markets will 
result in cheaper and higher quality goods and services as consumers shop around 
for the best deal and suppliers work to provide the best products at the lowest cost. 
This view suggests that contracting out saves money as the positive pressures of 
competition force organizations to find ways to work more efficiently
11. Although 
overall  the  empirical  evidence  about  cost  savings  through  contracting  out  social 
services suggests the potential for somewhat lower costs, it tends to be mixed. Some 
authors  have  argued  that  the  savings  provided  by  adopting  outsourcing  are 
significant, based on estimates of the benefits of competitive contracting out that 
imply reductions in costs by as much as 10-20 percent, at the same time as constant 
quality  is  maintained  (Domberger,  1998,  p.  163).  Other  researchers  go  further 
alleging that public bodies need to assess their functions according to their relevance 
to their core values, and contract out all the others
12. In education, a few World 
Bank  researchers  have  made  the  same  argument  for  developing  countries  raised 
earlier for the US: even if achievement is the same, private schools are generally 
less  costly  than  public  schools  and  therefore  more  cost-effective
13.  For  instance 
Jimenez  et  al.  (1991),  based  on  case  studies  that  compare
  private  and  public 
secondary  education  in  Colombia,  the  Dominican
  Republic,  the  Philippines, 
Tanzania, and Thailand, found that the unit costs of private schools are lower
 than 
those of public schools and that private school
 students generally outperform public 
school students on standardized
 math and language tests. These authors conclude 
that this finding is maintained even after controlling the fact that, on average, private 
school students
 in these countries come from more favorable backgrounds than
 their 
public  school  counterparts  (see  also  Lockheed  and  Jimenez,  1996).  However, 
researchers outside the World Bank point out that this cost analysis is erroneous. 
                                                 
11 This is thought to hold true for competition broadly, not only for competition by for-profit corporations. 
In fact, for some observers, what matters most is the extent of competition rather than simply whether the 
public or private sector is the provider (Kettl, 2000; Donahue, 1989; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
12 See Prahalad and Hamel (1990) for a managerial perspective on this subject. 
13 The most prominent example in the US deals with a private, for-profit firm, Edison Schools, Inc., that 
has been contracted by school districts to take over the operation of about 1,000 low-performing schools 
in several cities throughout the US. While Edison claims academic success, on the contrary, external 
evaluations  report  mediocre  performance,  with  Edison’s  students  doing  no  better  than  comparable 
students in public schools (Levin, 2006; Bracey, 2002; Saltman, 2000).   14
Often private school expenses are subsidized by religious organizations, parents’ 
contributions are not counted, and private schools do not accept many students that 
require greater expenses (Carnoy, 2000, 2002).  
•  Improving quality. The belief that the marketplace and competition will discipline 
organizations  that  provide  low-quality  goods  or  services  by  driving  them  out  of 
business is prevalent and contributes to support for contracting out (Eggers and Ng 
1993; GAO 1997). Although several experts argue that the different sectors will 
have different relative strengths, depending on the primary goals of the services (e. 
g., Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), some argue that private for-profit firms, especially 
large  ones,  might  also  have  easier  access  to  capital,  which  can  allow  them  to 
enhance the quality of services (Sanger 2001). However, there are some dissonant 
views: quality may suffer with privatization because the public sector loses some of 
its  accountability  (Milward  and  Provan  1993,  2000).  Also  in  contracting  out 
education empirical research on the quality of services outsourced is very limited, 
but like that on cost savings, it appears to be mixed. On the one hand, some authors, 
as  is  the  case  of  Bedi  and  Gard  (2000),  suggest  that  the  quality  of  services 
contracted  out  might  generally  be  higher  than  provision  of  identical  services 
provided  by  the  public  sector.  These  authors  (Bedi  and  Gard,  2000)  show  that 
graduates from private schools tend to earn higher wages in the labor market than 
those who are graduated from public schools. Also, in a few developing countries, 
research done by the World Bank reported that private school students performed 
better than public school students (Lockheed and Jimenez, 1996), but these studies 
hardly control for differences in students. On the other hand, a study looking at this 
question across ten Latin American countries found that private schools appeared 
better than public schools before other differences are controlled, in particular the 
fact that students attending private schools have a more favored peer group, is made. 
After controlling for these differences, private and public school students performed 
similarly (Somers et al., 2004). Also Benveniste et al. (2003) are skeptical about the 
idea that private schools provide a higher quality of education. 
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5. Cases of private sector involvement in education 
The private sector involvement in education in developing countries is not new, as is 
demonstrated by several examples of schooling in isolated areas, where the government 
has little presence and/or the church carries out missionary activities. This is the case of 
Mission Schools in Colombia, an education modality provided by the Catholic Church 
and financed by the government since the 19th century, and developed in remote areas, 
particularly in the Amazon region (Levine, 1979). A more recent example is the Fe y 
Alegría school network, a Jesuit initiative, which began its work in Venezuela in 1955 
and is mainly involved in providing educational services to low-income students. Its 
programs have spread through various Latin American countries in which it has also 
acquired  a  significant  presence  (Swope  and  Latorre,  2000).  Fe  y  Alegría  is  mainly 
involved  in  the  formal  education  system  at  elementary  level  and  is  funded  by 
contributions from the State and from private individuals. But its action is generally 
spilt over the usual functions of public schools: Fe y Alegría schools were successfully 
transformed  into  community  and  social  service  centers  ((Levine,  1979;  Swope  and 
Latorre, 2000).  
Both Colombian Mission Schools and Fe y Alegría Schools are innovative experiences 
in terms of community participation, schooling autonomy and school planning. This 
way of managing the schools has several advantages: the optimization of infrastructures 
and other material resources, the engagement of community in the school management 
process, which enforces the connection school-community and increases the sense of 
control by the community over schools. These experiences have some similarities with 
the  IDEAL  project,  which  is  a  national  collaborative  project  implemented  by  the 
government of Bangladesh with technical, financial and material support mainly from 
UNICEF to improve the quality of primary education (Mozumder and Halim, 2006). 
Colombian Mission Schools as well as Venezuelan Fe y Alegría network are examples 
of  not  for-profit  private  involvement  previous  to  the  NPM  wave  of  reforms.  More 
recently, unmet demand for education coupled with shrinking government budgets has 
induced the public sector to develop pioneering solutions with the private sector — 
private  for  profit,  private  not  for-profit,  non-governmental  organizations,  religious 
groups,  etc.  These  solutions  often  called  partnerships  have  involved  different   16
combinations between the public and the private sector, and are usually associated to 
demand-side  financing  mechanisms  focusing  on  educational  access  to  disadvantaged 
groups and communities, encouraging private sector provision and finance, as well as 
supporting international investments in education. In the following sub-sections we are 
going  to  describe  two  groups  of  combinations  between  funding  and  provision  of 
education.  
 
(1) Private sector funding of education  
The private sector funding of education provided by the government can be made by 
scholarships  and  student  loans  provided  by  private  organizations.  Some  of  such 
initiatives aim to improve the quality of public schools. In Colombia, there are two 
experiences that deserve mention. The first interesting case is that of privately managed 
institutions, which receive financing from companies, called Cajas de Compensación 
(Compensation Funds). The supporting firms have to contribute 4% of their workers’ 
salaries to these compensation funds (Mora, 2007). A large part of these resources are 
used on education, setting up very well financed private schools, which are attended by 
Cajas de Compensación’ members (Franco, 1991; Compensar, 1997; FPOS, 1999). In 
addition,  the  Cajas  de  Compensación  carry  out  a  wide  range  of  activities  in  the 
educational  environment:  nursery  and  pre-school  for  the  children  of  poor  families 
whose  mothers  need  to  work,  adult  education  (in  this  case  financed  by  the  actual 
companies they work in); vocational training using the school buildings outside school 
hours;  training  courses  for  young  people  who  are  not  part  of  the  school  system; 
libraries,  museums,  theatres  and  many  other  cultural  activities  (Franco,  1991; 
Compensar,  1997;  Mora,  2007).  Although  the  Cajas  de  Compensación  particularly 
assist their own members, they are outstanding illustrations of the use of private funds 
for public goals (Compensar, 1997; FPOS, 1999).  
Another  interesting  initiative  in  Colombia  is  the  Empresarios  por  la  Educación 
(Entrepreneurs for Education). This association has three main objectives: taking the 
regional lead in education; using the professional resources of their own companies to 
help improve management in educational centers; and supporting educational centers 
via  philanthropic  resources  (EXE,  2006).  The  association  is  divided  into  fourteen   17
decentralized regional groups. Each region works on three areas: improving educational 
management  by  supporting  educational  authorities,  training  the  people  who  manage 
educational centers and working to improve the employability of school leavers. These 
activities are carried out in many different ways, including volunteer programs. The 
companies  also  organize  co-operation  programs  with  schools,  and  staff  from  the 
companies involved may be included directly in the schools’ management. The effects 
of  this  bilateral  relationship  between  schools  and  companies  improve  mutual 
understanding between both systems and help teachers to be more receptive to more 
efficient management systems
14.  
Private sector initiatives in the public education system are also relevant in Brazil. An 
interesting case is that of GIFE (Grupo de Institutos, Fundações e Empresas – Group of 
Institutes,  Foundations  and  Companies),  an  association  of  80  large  companies  that 
assures around 400 million dollars per year to support public schools (GIFE, 2003). 
This association began in 1985, when democracy was established, with the aim of trying 
to resolve some of the country’s social problems. Some foreign companies were the first 
ones to start these initiatives (Mora, 2007). Even if we one consider this as a marketing 
exercise  of  the  large  corporations  involved,  they  are  also  understandable  the 
preoccupations of firms with the low quality of the public education system, and with 
the fact that companies themselves need to invest in education to improve the quality of 
the labor force they employ. So, GIFE focuses aid on training programs outside formal 
school  hours,  too  (students  of  Brazilian  public  schools,  just  like  the  majority  of 
countries  in  the  Latin  American  region,  have  a  part-time  school  timetable)  (Mora, 
2007).  
AlfaSol,  abbreviation  of  Alfabetização  Solidaria  (Solidarity  Literacy)  is  a  similar 
initiative  carried  out  by  private  organizations  with  the  aim  of  developing  solidarity 
programs with lower status students. AlfaSol was founded in 1997 by 11 companies and 
38 Institutions of Higher Education (IES). In its very first year of operation, AlfaSol 
attended 9.2 thousand students and trained 442 literacy teachers in 38 municipalities in 
the North and Northeast of Brazil, which have the highest illiteracy rates in the country. 
One of the innovative points within the activities of AlfaSol in Brazil is the formation of 
                                                 
14  Other  similar  initiatives  in  Colombia  are  Fundación  Corona,  and  the  Corporación  Mixta  Para  El 
Desarrollo de la Educación Básica – Corpoeducación. (See Mora, 2006).   18
an  unprecedented  high  number  of  partnerships  in  Brazil.  AlfaSol  has  consolidated 
significant results: associations are maintained with countless companies, universities, 
citizens,  municipalities  and  Governments,  and  this  has  been  essential  for  the 
development of the Organization. AlfaSol served approximately 3 million youths and 
adults throughout June 2002. The positive results have been acknowledged on both the 
national and the international levels. One the one hand, its model has been exported to 
other Portuguese-speaking countries such as Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, and also to Spanish-speaking Guatemala. On the other hand, in 2005, AlfaSol 
was admitted to operational relations with UNESCO (2005)
15. 
 
(2) Government assistance to the private sector 
Government  support  to  the  private  sector  usually  consists  of  providing  funds  for 
students or financing private schools. In some cases the governmental positive effects 
on schools are linked to situations in which the government provides subsidies directly 
to private schools, whereas in other cases, government contracts with private providers 
all or part of the educational services for public schools. The latter instance covers a 
wide range of cases, from comprehensively outsourcing the entire management of a 
school to partially outsourcing individual services such as the distribution of textbooks 
or the management of subsidiary services such as catering. 
Examples  of  schemes  whereby  government  funding  is  provided  directly  to  the 
beneficiaries include the provision of scholarships or student loans to students attending 
private schools and voucher schemes
16. The basic mechanism behind voucher schemes 
involves coupons being issued by the government to school-aged children. The children 
or their parents are then free to choose which school they attend. Depending on how 
they are used, there are two more possible reasons for introducing voucher schemes: i) 
to encourage competition between schools, which is supposed to increase the quality of 
education provision, as argued below; ii) to reduce inequality, by attributing vouchers to 
specific  groups  of  people  in  order  to  improve  access  to  education  for  less  favored 
                                                 
15 The official announcement that operational relations had been established between the Brazilian and 
the international organization was made during the 172nd Session of the Executive Body on International 
Non-Governmental Organizations, which was held at the UNESCO headquarters, in Paris. 
16 For a critical view about school vouchers see Ladd (2002).   19
groups,  in  the  same  way  as  providing  scholarships  or  loans
17.  Conditional  on  the 
number of accumulated coupons and under some voucher schemes, schools can apply to 
the government for additional public funding. 
The use of demand-side financing mechanisms, such as vouchers, and capitation grants, 
is common in many developing nations (Patrinos, 2000). These types of mechanisms 
are being increasingly used to help poor families invest in schooling. Examples include 
compensating poor families for school attendance charges (e.g. in Bangladesh, Pakistan 
and Guatemala
18), providing student loans at higher education level (e.g. in Jamaica), 
non-monetary  community  support  in  the  form  of  land,  labor,  materials  and  social 
marketing  of  the  benefits  of  education  (e.g.  in  Tanzania).  Additionally,  many 
developing countries provide subsidies to private schools that take in poor students, 
such as the Dominican Republic and Côte d’Ivoire (Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997). 
Part of the conceptual framework of demand-side financing in education is the issue of 
choice. The focus is on the individual (or parents, in the case of basic education). In 
fact,  the  calls  for  parental  choice  are  usually  directly  related  to  efforts  to  improve 
educational outcomes, as part of an overall reform effort. School choice is promoted as 
a means of increasing competition in the school system as has been argued along time 
(Friedman, 1997). It is believed that competition will lead to efficiency gains as schools 
–  public  and  private  –  compete  for  students  and  try  to  improve  their  quality  while 
reducing expenses. By encouraging more private schools, vouchers will allow school 
managers  to  become  innovative  and  thereby  bring  improvements  to  the  learning 
process. Free-choice schooling changes the incentives that schools are faced with and 
encourages them to deliver better quality schooling at a lower cost (Gauri, 1998; Levin, 
2002). Public schools, in order to attract the resources that come with students, will 
likewise need to improve.  
One pioneer experience in developing countries occurred in 1981 in Chile, as part of the 
Pinochet government’s extensive market-oriented reforms, when a nationwide school 
                                                 
17  The  bulk  of  the  discussion  of  the  relative  merits  of  school  vouchers  is  about  equity  rather  than 
effectiveness outcomes (see e.g., Epple and Romano 1998; Nechyba 2000; Ladd 2002). 
18 In Guatemala, for example, vouchers are issued only to girls from poor backgrounds between the age of 
seven and fourteen, in an effort to boost the number of girls in education. Very low scholarships ($4.00 
per month) have been consistently successful in getting girls to stay in school (Cortina and Stromquist, 
2000).   20
voucher program with financial incentives for both public and private institutions was 
introduced (Gauri, 1998; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003; Delannoy, 2000). This initiative 
had three main components: (i) decentralization of public schools. Public schools were 
transferred from the Ministry of Education to roughly 300 municipalities, in such a way 
that they became known as municipal schools; (ii) public school funding. Municipal 
schools continued to be funded centrally, but each municipality started to receive a per-
student payment for every child attending school. As a result, enrolment losses came to 
have a direct financial effect on the municipal education budget; (iii) public funding for 
private schools. The size of the voucher payment each school receives varies according 
to the educational level at which it operates, whether it offers special programs, and its 
distance from urban centers. Non tuition-charging, subsidized private schools began to 
receive exactly the same per-student payment as the municipal schools (McEwan and 
Carnoy, 2000).  
The alleged objectives of this reform were twofold. On the one hand, the idea was to 
bring educational decision-making closer to the different territories and on the other, to 
generate competition for student enrolments between municipal and private school as 
financing was linked to the number of students enrolled at each school
19. One of the 
results of this reform was the large-scale transfer of students from municipal schools to 
subsidized private schools. The subsidized private sector grew from 15% to 33% over a 
period of ten years, together with a similar decrease in the budget percentage for public 
education over the same period (MINEDUC, 2003).  
In  the  recent  past,  programs  for  expanding  coverage  outside  the  traditional  public 
system framework have been also promoted in Colombia
20. There were two types of 
programs:  direct  subsidies  to  students  (vouchers)  and  purchase  of  enrolment.  The 
voucher  scheme  was  introduced  by  the  Colombian  government  in  1991,  with  the 
assistance of the World Bank, as part of a framework for decentralization (King et al., 
1998) and was predominant as a strategy to expand coverage during the 1990s. The 
program was co-financed by central government and the territorial entity. The aim of 
the scheme was to increase the percentage of children, particularly those from poor 
                                                 
19 For an equity view on the use of school vouchers as competition tools, see Epple and Romano (1998). 
20 Voucher schemes have also been introduced in other developing countries, such as Ivory Coast and 
Kenya for formal education, and Paraguay for training (Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997; Patrinos, 2000).   21
backgrounds,  advancing  from  primary  to  secondary  schooling  and  to  expand  the 
provision of secondary education services through the private sector (King et al, 1997, 
1998). Because vouchers were issued to the children in the two lowest of six socio-
economic levels, based on census data, this was a program that has targeted the poor. 
The children that have finished primary school were then issued with vouchers for the 
first year in secondary school and gained a new voucher when they advanced to the next 
year in secondary school. It has been confirmed that this program has increased the 
percentage  of  poor  children  advancing  to  secondary  school  and  has  stepped  up 
competition between schools, including public schools (King et al., 1997, 1998
21). 
The second type of program of educational reform in Colombia was the Purchase of 
Enrolment in Private Schools which was used by departments and municipalities (such 
as Bogotá, Medellín, Cartagena) to respond in a quick and flexible fashion to the social 
pressures for broader, better quality coverage, due to the increase of the demand for new 
enrolments,  particularly  in  the  less  favored  social  sectors.  These  authorities  have 
contracted  education  services  with  private  schools  and  pay  for  each  child  admitted 
according to defined standards (Villa and Duarte, 2004; Mora, 2007). The evaluation of 
these  initiatives  have  shown  that  there  were  severe  restrictions  to  the  proposed 
objectives due to the characteristics of the market in which they were implemented, 
particularly the limits imposed by the availability and information in the poor areas they 
operate in (Villa and Duarte, 2004). 
In  this  second  modality,  the  public  school  concession  (Colegios  en  Concesión)  in 
Bogotá, which began in 2000 as an experimental program, is paradigmatic. Bogotá has 
a large concentration of private schools (28% of national private school enrolment), and 
many of these are among the best-performing in the country (46 out of the 96 best 
performing  schools).  Hoping to capitalize on the concentration of successful private 
institutions locally, the Secretariat of Education for the Bogotá District (SED) launched 
a concession program, through which a private organization or group takes over the 
management of one or more public schools newly built by the SED, largely in low-
income neighborhoods. The opportunity to manage the schools was then offered in a 
public  procurement  process,  where  bidders  were  evaluated  on  their  proposed 
                                                 
21 See also Angrist et al (2002).   22
management plans. A total of 26 Concession Schools have been opened (World Bank, 
2005).  
Concession Schools are financially supported with subsidy per student (slightly higher 
than the maximum subsidy on the demand in Bogotá). These schools are built in new 
buildings  with  better  services  and  the  management  is  much  more  professional.  In 
addition, these schools keep students the whole day (as opposed to public schools which 
have morning or afternoon sessions) (Villa and Duarte, 2004). Until now the evaluation 
of the performance of these schools is not made but it is quite likely that the levels of 
quality and performance in terms of drop outs and retention will be better than in many 
of the public or private schools with students from a similar family background (Mora, 
2007). The most obvious reason for the expected positive results relies on the fact that 
concessions  have  been  given  to  the  best  pools  of  private  institutions  (schools  and 
universities) in the area (World Bank, 2005). This has an obvious advantage: to apply 
the experience gained from managing quality schools to the new schools in the poorest 
neighborhoods  (Villa  and  Duarte,  2004).  Concessionaries  have  already  produced 
remarkable results in management improvements: they allocate on average 55% of the 
per capita income to human resources, well below the 90% allocation by the public 
school  system,  freeing  up  27%  for  nutritional  support  and  5%  for  textbooks  and 
educational materials (Rodríguez and Hovde, 2002)
22.  
The predicted positive effects of the Public School Concession Model are based on the 
view that the program buys know-how and knowledge to strengthen the public sector 
and collaborate efficiently in the provision of high-quality education for the poorest. 
Also, because private institutions can apply either individually or as a group to manage 
one  or  several  public  schools,  these  linkages  create  a  spillover  effect  by  which 
knowledge and best-practices are extended to the public schools sector and hopefully 
will survive to the concessionary contract (Rodríguez, 2005).  
In Brazil, public funding of private education is not legally permitted. However, there 
are various social responsibility initiatives from the private sector involved in public 
education, as well as some embryonic initiatives by the public sector towards the private 
                                                 
22 This is beneficial, but it has a disadvantage. The salaries and working conditions of teachers in these 
schools  are  worse  than  in  the  public  sector.  In  consequence,  teachers  may  be  motivated  to  leave 
Concession Schools when they have the chance with the consequent negative effects on the school. This 
may be a source of instability.   23
sector of the education system. According Mora (2007), the public sector has promoted 
several programs to help improve public schools and in particular the way they are 
managed with the aid of large corporations and institutions. Some of these programs are 
promoted by the Federal Government as the Acorda Brasil program, supported by the 
Ministry of Education; others are initiatives of the local authorities as is the case of the 
program  implemented  in  Sao  Paulo  with  the  aim  of  bring  private  administrators  to 
improve  the  management  of  public  schools;  some  other  programs are  collaborations 
between  governmental  departments  (education  and  labor)  as  is  the  case  of  PROEP 
(Programa da Expansão da Educação Profissional)
23 program. This latter program has 
built new vocational training schools, and provided them with economic support for 
technical development. Irrespective of the entity that has built those schools, in legal 
terms, they are private, owned by not-for-profit community institutions (MEC, 2001; 
Emerique, 2004).  
There are also two notable cases of private involvement in higher education, in Brazil: 
the first is a recent program aimed at helping students with low resources to gain access 
to higher education in private institutions. This is called the University for All program. 
It offers tax exemption to private universities that use 10% of their income to provide 
grants to students with limited resources. The program currently provides free access to 
112,000 students and there are plans for this figure to reach 300,000 (Mora, 2007). 
An interesting phenomenon in Brazil is the fact that some big corporations from the 
private sector of the educational system also work in the public sector (Rodríguez and 
Hovde, 2002). We shall look at two cases: Pitágoras and Positivo. These big private 
corporations represent an innovative effort by the private sector to support both private 
and  public  schools  through  an  integrated  school  improvement  package  offering 
administrative  and  technical  support  to  affiliated  schools.  They  have  their  own 
curriculum and provide textbooks for each grade and subject, which are updated yearly 
and sold to the parents of children attending the network schools. Besides providing 
schools with an integrated curriculum and textbooks, they offer principals and schools a 
wide  range  of  professional  development  opportunities  and  management  support. 
Administrators  receive  management  support  and  teachers  have  access  to  training 
                                                 
23 That is, Program for Expanding Professional Education.   24
courses, videos to complement classroom teaching, and a web-based information and 
question hotline. In the case of public schools, the participation of these companies is 
funded  by  selling  books  to  the  schools.  In  addition,  Pitágoras  provides  training  in 
quality  management  in  schools  that  are  funded  by  collaborating  corporations 
(Rodríguez and Hovde, 2002). 
In Venezuela in contrast, the fragility of civil society prevents the active participation of 
business  leaders  or  other  social  actors  in  education.  In  fact,  there  is  no  active 
participation of social players in education, as is the case in Brazil or Colombia. The 
only  public-private  combination  in  education  is  the  government  funding  of  certain 
private schools. The most important example is the agreement between the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Sport (MECD) and some of the Catholic schools associated in 
the AVEC (Venezuelan Association of Catholic Education)
24.  
The AVEC is constituted of more than 700 Catholic schools (with the prominence of Fe 
y Alegría), the majority of which are involved in teaching the poorest sectors of society. 
The MECD-AVEC Agreement is focused on several types of schools: schools providing 
formal  education  at  elementary  level  without  receiving  any  fees  from  the  students; 
technical and farming schools and other vocational schools, etc. The financial support 
given by the Venezuelan Government to private education, and in particular to Catholic 
education,  goes  back  a  long  way.  However,  until  1990  the  subsidies  from  the 
Government  must  be  negotiated  every  year.  From  1990  onwards,  the  Agreement 
between  the  MECD  and  AVEC  was  institutionalized  and  has  finished  with  the 
instability  resulted  from  uncertainty  of  the  Government  support.  In  2001,  the  aid 
benefited 459,000 students (González and Arévalo, 2004).  
In  some  countries,  governmental  assistance  to  private  schools  concerns  teachers  or 
textbooks.  For  instance,  in  Indonesia,  where  private  junior  secondary  schools  are 
generally considered to be of poor quality, the most important source of assistance from 
the  government  to  the  private  sector  has  been  the  provision  of  government-paid 
teachers,  who  make  up  about  15  percent  of  all  teachers  in  private  schools.  A 
government teacher is not only a substantial subsidy in itself, but it also has a halo 
effect:  it  appears  that  schools  with  government  teachers  are  able  to  attract  higher 
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contributions  from  families  and  non-profit foundations. The  second  major  source  of 
assistance is the distribution of textbooks (Duncan, 2000, pp. 147-9). In Bangladesh the 
government  pays  80  percent  of  primary  school  teacher  salaries  in  registered  non-
government schools and provides textbooks to non-government schools. However, in 
secondary education, in which 95 percent of all schools are non-governmental, and are 
managed by local school managing committees, they receive substantial subventions 
from the government (Ahmed, 2000). 
In People’s Republic of China, a private industrial and commercial company, South 
Ocean Development Group (SOG) got involved closely with the private education in 
1994, when the first SOG School was set up. Five years later, the SOG educational 
consortium hoped to expand into a chain of six schools and two universities. Although 
its  original  business  covered  real  estate,  tourism,  mining  and  high-tech  products, 
nowadays South Ocean Development Group is a private education company in its full 
sense.  As  stated  by  one  Director  of  SOG,  the  success  of  South  Ocean  Schools  in 
education is mainly due to ‘sufficient capital input, efficient school management, highly 
qualified  teachers,  enriched  curriculum  design,  and  optional  higher  learning 
opportunities’  (Jiang,  2000,  p.186).  South  Ocean  Group  has  been  raising  expansion 
capital most often on a self-reliance basis, the contribution of the government being 
limited to a policy that does not place obstacles to the expansion of the school network, 
namely  concerning  to  ‘property  ownership,  profitability  and  a  free  flow  of  human 
resources’  (Jiang,  2000,  p.188).  We  may  add  to  this  picture  the  incredible  market 
demand  for  private  education  together  with  the  unparalleled  high  rate  of  economic 
growth of China. 
 
6. Conditions for building PPPs and the need of regulation 
Both macroeconomic and microeconomic conditions affect the building of a PPP in a 
specific country. Concerning the macro level, political factors are important: without an 
overall political environment favoring both private for-profit and not-for-profit activities 
no real partnership can be established. In countries where civil society and/or the private 
sector are discriminated, as in the Venezuelan case, the government will remain the 
dominant financer and/or supplier of education services. Concerning the micro-level,   26
several  conditions  are  also  important.  First  of  all,  there  must  be  an  interest  and  a 
commitment of some individuals to make a PPP happen. If there is an interest in a PPP 
and an acceptance of the different partners to be involved, then one has to look at the 
capacities of the different actors. In this respect, we have to consider not only the skills 
of  the  staff  to  provide  specific  services,  but  also  the  financial  availability  for  an 
engagement  in  service  provision  and  the  overall  organizational  and  management 
structure. Ultimately, the sustainability of the reforms and the ability of the public sector 
to use money more effectively in leveraging private money will depend significantly on 
the political commitment to design and carry out effective regulatory policies. 
The most important changes in the last two decades in the provision of public services, 
particularly  if  government  follows  a  contracting  out  solution,  call  for  strong  and 
competent  economic  regulation  of  educational  services,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the 
interests of all parties are protected, both in developed and developing countries. Such 
protection is necessary primarily, to defend the children’ interests but also those of the 
public and private parties to a contract. However, the role of institutions in charge of 
carrying out regulatory functions is even more important in developing countries than in 
developed  ones  (Pessoa,  2007).  In  the  former,  owing  to  several  reasons  that  affect 
differently the two groups of countries, a much more intrusive and demanding form of 
regulation is required. Besides the reduced educational level of the population and the 
scarcity  of  infrastructures,  which  may  restrict  the  availability  and  circulation  of 
information,  the  non-competitive  industry  structures  and/or  lack  of  capital  market 
discipline  make  that  too  little  market  information  is  revealed  and  information 
asymmetries are overwhelming.  
In educational services, as in public services in general, to be effective, regulators must 
fill three qualities: i) competence, ii) independence, and iii) legitimacy (Pessoa, 2007). 
However, many, if not all, regulators in developing countries lack one or all of the three 
qualities required for effective regulation (World Bank, 2004). This lack can result from 
different  reasons,  including  limited  resources,  repeated  political  interference  in 
regulatory decisions, difficulty in attracting and retaining competent staff, and short or 
no history of performing regulatory functions.    27
These deficiencies in turn limit the capacity of agencies in charge of regulation to act as 
effective  regulators.  Of  course,  developing  countries  can  contract  out  regulatory 
functions  taking  advantage  of  the  developing  assistance.  Though  this  can  be  a 
temporary solution it is in many cases seen as a foreign interference in internal affairs 
and it is consequently felt as a lack of independence of the regulators. Where there is 
lack  of  independence  we  can’t  prospect  either  great  legitimacy  or  competence. 
Furthermore,  as  has  been  acknowledged ‘paradoxically,  those  regulators  who would 
most benefit from contracting out are the ones that have most difficulties in entering 
into such agreements to bring about a satisfactory outcome, either for lack of financial 
capacity or capacity to monitor performance…’ (World Bank, 2004, p. 43). 
Within the framework of NPM reforms, in order that the new, privatized market be 
efficient and equitable, it must be well regulated by the government so that it operates in 
ways  that  maximize  social  returns.  Justifications  for  expanded  outsourcing  of  basic 
services clearly recognize this: ‘Capacity in government to contract out and to regulate 
is required’ (World Bank, 2001, p. 17); ‘strengthening the capability of the state to 
develop and supervise health and education systems is thus critical’ [and so] ‘major 
capacity and institution-building of public sector agencies is required to fulfill this role’ 
(World Bank, 2002, p. 18). So, similarly to the occurred in the public sector in general, 
perhaps the single most important issue in the outsourcing of education is regulation. 
In education, outsourcing requires considerable regulation so as to have a chance of 
operating well, equitably, in the public interest, transparently, and free of corruption. 
Regulation  of  a  privatized  educational  system  means  setting  up  a  structure  that  can 
undertake, among other things: approval of qualifying private schools; evaluation and 
approval  of curricula; verification of student attendance; new financial disbursement 
and  control  systems;  school  inspections;  some  form  of  teacher  and  principal 
qualifications guarantee; development of standardized testing on a large scale for all 
grade levels; a safe system of carrying out and grading tests that guards against fraud; 
and an infrastructure devoted to test the eligibility for subsidies. All this calls for the 
development  of  a  large  new  regulatory  bureaucracy  because  those  functions  require 
personnel with different training and different tasks. Levin (1998) argues that, for these 
reasons,  providing  effective  regulation  will  make  large-scale  voucher  systems  very   28
costly
25. Additionally, there is some apprehension about the potential of outsourcing to 
produce considerable fraud and corruption if managerial control by the public sector is 
weak, as had already been argued by Timmins (1986), in a more general context.  
 
7. Concluding remarks 
The  different  cases  we  have  highlighted  show  that  the  possibilities  of  private 
involvement in the provision of educational services are numerous, varied and multi-
purposed.  They  also  show  that  between  the  ‘supplier’  relationship  and  the  ‘public 
enterprise’ model, there is large room for building new forms of collaboration of private 
sector in education in a specific country. Among these forms an embryonic strategic 
PPP  with  capabilities,  which  are  superior  to  the  ones  of  its originator partners,  can 
appear. With respect to education this type of PPP has more positive effects than a pure 
outsourcing solution because it can exploit more fully the complementary capabilities 
and  competences,  which  exist  in  the  partner  organization(s),  and  can  offer  more 
opportunities for mutual learning between partners. 
However, because the conditions that developing countries can offer to build strategic 
PPPs are limited, the importance of distinguishing among the forms of private sector 
involvement, which are strategic PPPs from those that are pure outsourcing solutions 
must  not  be  overemphasized.  The  cases  presented  show  that  in  practice  there  is  an 
ample  frontier  zone  between  those  two  typical  forms,  where  some  interesting 
collaborative experiences are situated (e.g., Alfasol, Acorda Brasil, Empresarios por la 
Educación), which in addition to the direct effect on educational level have a significant 
importance in increasing social interactions and in building and maturing social capital. 
An importance that is seldom acknowledged. 
In the logic of NPM, the decision to outsource a social service in a particular country is 
seen as a technical choice, a question of efficiency. This implies the assumption that 
there is a market containing a range of provider alternatives from which the government 
can decide who is best positioned to deliver the contract with the highest service, lowest 
cost,  and  greatest  expertise (Van Slyke, 2003). However, assuming the existence of 
                                                 
25 Perhaps this was the reason why Chile remains the only country that has adopted a countrywide system 
of vouchers.   29
such  competitive  markets  could  show  overoptimistic  especially  in  the  case  of 
developing  economies  often  with  a  greater  tendency  for  suffer  simultaneously  from 
market failures, incomplete markets, weak private sector capacity, and a smaller number 
of competent market players.  
Given  that  the  scarce  empirical  results  about  the  superior  quality  of  privately-run 
schools  are  at  best  mixed,  the  task  facing  education  sector  reform  in  developing 
countries at this point should not be the divestiture of public schools or contracting out 
education  services  to  the  private  sector  under  abstract  assumptions  about  market 
superiority over administrative mechanisms. Instead, the important task is to discover 
better approaches to building the necessary capacity advances, which address popular 
discontent in ways that take into consideration the realities of good governance. These 
other  alternative  approaches  to  educational  reform  should  center  the  attention  on 
improving  the  capacity  of  both  public  authorities  and  private  providers  and  not  in 
increasing the capacity of one partner in detriment of the other partner’s role. Strategic 
and  cooperative  PPPs  in  which  governments  are  substantially  involved  allow  the 
exploitation  of  synergies  and  other  positive  results  associated  to  the  managerial 
flexibility and to the organizational competence. The cases highlighted show that such 
collaborative arrangements hold the potential for improving efficiency and positively 
affect the self-confidence of individuals and communities.  
So, the main conclusion is that contracting out education services to private providers 
(for  instance,  Concession  Schools  in  Colombia)  need  not  be  made  a  priority  in 
developing countries. The real priority is to build the structural and policy capacity of 
the public sector, and to embed public entities within society through mechanisms that 
ensure  accountability,  transparency  and  participatory  processes  in  their  everyday 
actions. Participatory processes can take several forms, but in the context of this paper, 
we  mean  the  inclusion  of  private  sector  organizations  that  can  enter  into  strategic 
partnerships with public bodies in ways that will not prevent the active involvement of 
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